







The Principled Leadership of Middle 
Management: Stephen F. Williams’s Liberal 
Critique of Marks 
Peter Conti-Brown† 
Most law students spend their first year—or sometimes much 
longer—struggling to discern legal rules from judicial opinions. That is true 
even for relatively straightforward opinions. When they encounter 
splintered opinions—especially cases where no opinion commands a 
majority—the exercise becomes more difficult even for the most seasoned 
lawyer. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in an effort to add coherence to these not-
infrequent instances of judicial disarray, created a rule to guide this 
process. The so-called Marks rule instructs courts, including the Supreme 
Court itself, to honor horizontal and vertical stare decisis even in the face 
of splintered decisions by discerning what proposition, if appropriately 
narrowed, would have commanded a majority.1 It is a hypothetical exercise 
and a controversial one. Legal scholar Richard Re has recently 
recommended that we cast it aside entirely, a position I embrace below.2 
In this Essay, I will walk through a recent controversy involving Marks 
as tribute to one of the masters of the judicial craft, Stephen F. Williams. 
Although not my area of scholarly expertise3—nor was it his, for that 
matter—I will explain Judge Williams’s deep commitment to individual 
liberty, especially when criminal defendants faced terms of incarceration 
that the law arguably did not support. Judge Williams knew the law and 
understood the arts and sciences of judging. He knew that that science 
imposed limits on the exercise of his own arbitrary will. But he knew too 
that law’s frequent indeterminacy—even and especially when the Supreme 
Court was the source of that indeterminacy—meant that he had to exercise 
his own judgment, even if that judgment ran counter to those of some or 
many Justices of the Supreme Court. 
 
† Assistant Professor at The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and 
Nonresident Fellow in Economic Studies, The Brookings Institution.  
1. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
2. Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1942, 1945 (2019).  
3. For more comprehensive treatments of sentencing reform, including on the question 
of crack-powder disparities, see Carol S. Steiker, Lessons from Two Failures: Sentencing for 
Cocaine and Child Pornography Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the United States, 
76 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2013).    
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To demonstrate these principles, I will describe the path of specific 
cases in the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit on the question of what 
sentencing relief, if any, defendants should receive after the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission modified sentences associated with the possession 
and distribution of crack cocaine. The story begins with a splintered 
Supreme Court decision, Freeman v. United States.4 Freeman tried to 
determine whether prisoners incarcerated for sentences later adjusted 
downward could qualify for reductions if they entered prison via plea 
agreement.5 Tried, it should be said, but failed, forcing that burden on 
lower courts, which dutifully attempted to discern a common basis of three 
opinions in the Freeman scrum to muster the majority that the Supreme 
Court itself could not do. In Epps v. United States, the D.C. Circuit 
rejected that consensus and denied the Supreme Court the benefit that the 
Justices themselves could not obtain.6 Five years later, the Supreme Court 
raised the white flag, adopting the Epps view in Hughes v. United States, 
this time with six votes.7 
This romp through sentencing reform in the 2010s will not break any 
new ground, but it does reinforce two ideas that need reinforcement. First, 
it provides a helpful illustration of the poverty of Marks, a legal doctrine 
that, in Richard Re’s words, “is wrong, root and stem.”8 Second, it points 
to the extraordinary burden that crack-powder disparities place on the 
human lives of those that rationally entered into plea agreements to avoid 
draconian sentences only to see the reductions of sentencing guidelines 
rendered unavailable to them. How many years of incarceration were 
needlessly and cruelly imposed on our fellow citizens because of the 
incoherence of Freeman? 
Finally, perhaps most importantly, this Essay will pay tribute to my 
friend and mentor, Stephen F. Williams. This is not a personal tribute.9 
Instead, I want to explain and defend how Judge Williams viewed his own 
role within our legal system. He often jokingly referred to his role as an 
appellate judge as “middle management”: he had to review the decisions 
of trial courts and agencies but was himself subject to the big bosses at the 
Supreme Court. But there was a principled, steely resolve behind that 
humor. He was not bound to follow the Supreme Court out of ceremonial 
deference or an exaggerated sense of hierarchy. He was bound because 
that was the law. And when the Supreme Court failed in its fundamental 
 
4. 564 U.S. 522 (2011) (plurality opinion). 
5. Id. at 525. 
6. 707 F.3d 337, 350 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  
7. 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018). 
8. Re, supra note 2, at 1945. 
9. I write more about that influence in Peter Conti-Brown, Remembering Judge Stephen 
F. Williams, REG. REV. (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/08/18/conti-brown-
remembering-judge-stephen-f-williams/ [https://perma.cc/49JQ-S7US]. 
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task of saying what the law is, that decisional burden fell to his willing 
hands. 
So it was that Judge Williams launched an effort to open the prison 
doors just a bit, consistent with statute, regulation, and legal reason. To 
understand that, we must get to the problem the Freeman Court thought 
it was solving but, in fact, only made worse. 
I. The Freeman Problem 
In 1986, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which established 
a 100:1 ratio in the differences between penalties associated with powder 
cocaine and crack cocaine.10 The disparity, which endured for twenty years, 
is a shocking instance of systemic racism, given how the sentencing 
disparities affected white and black communities differently and had no 
justification in the relative differences in potency of the two drugs.11 
In 2007, the U.S. Sentencing Commission revised its guidelines to 
slightly less than 18:1.12 Congress also wrote that ratio into law in the Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010.13 Henceforth, the disparity between the two drugs, 
better justified by differences in potency, would be substantially less 
draconian. 
On its face, whatever the prospective benefits of that reduction, the 
masses of people incarcerated on the old standard would be with little hope 
of relief. Fortunately, Congress provided a narrow exception to the general 
rule that criminal sentences are final on delivery. The exception is linked 
explicitly to sentencing guidelines: “in the case of a defendant who has 
been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range 
that has subsequently been lowered” by the Sentencing Commission, the 
court may reduce the original sentence.14 For cases in which a sentencing 
court reaches its conclusions by using the advisory guidelines, the 
discretion to reduce the sentence is clear. But such cases are a slim 
minority: only two percent of accused defendants proceed to trial. Fully 
 
10. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207 (amended 
2010).  
11. See, e.g., Deborah J. Vagins & Jesselyn McCurdy, Cracks in the System: Twenty 
Years of the Unjust Federal Crack Cocaine Law, ACLU (Oct. 2006), 
https://www.aclu.org/other/cracks-system-20-years-unjust-federal-crack-cocaine-law 
[https://perma.cc/N6E9-4PTW]. 
12. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION: SUPPLEMENT TO THE 2010 GUIDELINES 
MANUAL 16-17, 43 (2010) (effective Nov. 1, 2007). All ratios are expressed by reference to 
“marihuana,” with 1 gram of cocaine as the equivalent of 200 grams of marihuana and 1 gram of 
cocaine base—crack—as 3,571 grams.  
13. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).  
14. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2018).  
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ninety percent enter plea agreements instead.15 Are those people eligible 
for sentence reductions, too? 
That was the question that the Supreme Court faced in Freeman v. 
United States. The case generated three opinions. Four Justices joined an 
opinion by Justice Kennedy that would have held that “the district court 
has authority to entertain [sentencing reductions] when sentences are 
imposed in light of the Guidelines, even if the defendant enters into [a plea 
agreement].”16 The logic here is obvious: there is no peculiar statutory 
meaning to the phrase “based on.”17 And these ninety percent of plea 
agreements often occur in the shadow of the Guidelines: the Guidelines 
provide the basis for negotiation.  
The four-Justice dissent, led by Chief Justice Roberts, didn’t see it that 
way. In their view, a “sentence imposed under a . . . plea agreement is 
based on the agreement, not the Sentencing Guidelines,” a logic that 
applies even if “the agreement could be said to ‘use’ or ‘employ’ a 
Guidelines range in arriving at the particular sentence specified in the 
agreement.”18 
Justice Sotomayor concurred with the plurality opinion in the 
judgment, but only barely.19 She agreed with the dissent on the first 
proposition: “the term of imprisonment imposed by a district court 
pursuant to [a plea agreement] is ‘based on’ the agreement itself, not on 
the judge’s calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines.”20 That said, when the 
plea agreement “expressly uses a Guidelines sentencing range,” it can be 
said to be “based on” that range.21 Justice Sotomayor’s opinion did not 
thoroughly explain how both things could be true—how a plea agreement’s 
sentence could both be based on the Guidelines and based on itself—
except to ask questions about the state of negotiations in the plea 
agreement itself. The other eight Justices criticized the apparatus that this 
kind of inquiry would create, but ultimately, all that emerged from the 
rubble of Freeman was clarity for Mr. Freeman himself: because Justice 
Sotomayor agreed that Mr. Freeman’s plea agreement was explicitly based 
on the Guidelines, five Justices permitted the district court to reduce his 
sentence. 
II. Freeman and Marks in the D.C. Circuit 
 
15. Trials Are Rare in the Federal Criminal Justice System, and When They Happen, 
Most End in Convictions, PEW RES. CTR. (June 10, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/ft_19-06-
11_trialsandguiltypleas-featuredimage/ [https://perma.cc/DDH9-25VF]. 
16. Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 530 (2011) (plurality opinion). 
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2018). 
18. Freeman, 564 U.S. at 544 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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Giving guidance to appellate courts—and to the Supreme Court itself, 
through stare decisis—in the face of a splintered opinion is not a new 
problem. The Supreme Court has attempted to answer that challenge via 
the Marks rule, named for the Supreme Court case that expounded it: 
“When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale 
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the 
court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .”22 
Seems plausible enough. If there is a rule of decision that five Justices 
embrace, even if they would go this way or that on other important 
questions, then there should be no formal difference between an opinion 
signed by five Justices and principles embraced by five Justices writing 
separately. 
But in practice, the most important of these legal controversies—
those very controversies that create the splintered opinions at the Supreme 
Court—are not going to be so easily nested. Freeman provides the 
example, although nearly every such opinion presents its own interpretive 
challenges that lay bare the rule’s weaknesses. Although five Justices 
agreed that the district court could hear Mr. Freeman’s request for a 
reduction in his sentence, eight Justices viewed Justice Sotomayor’s 
Schroedinger’s cat opinion—wherein sentences are simultaneously based 
on and not based on the Guidelines—as “arbitrary”23 and adverse to the 
very purposes of Congress’s efforts at sentencing reform. In other words, 
as Richard Re argued, “Bizarrely, the Court’s least popular view became 
law . . . .”24 
Except, as Re noted, in the D.C. Circuit.25 In a joint opinion in Epps, 
authored by Judge Williams and Judge Rogers, the D.C. Circuit—the first 
court to depart from the Sotomayor standard in applying Freeman—
carefully and thoroughly reviewed both the splintered opinion and, 
importantly, the D.C. Circuit’s and the Supreme Court’s own Marks 
jurisprudence.26 In King v. Palmer, Judge Silberman wrote—and Judge 
Williams joined—an en banc opinion on the meaning of a statute 
interpreting a fee-shifting provision for the prevailing party in certain 
disputes.27 The opinion also offered this critical view of Marks, an opinion 
 
22. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
23. Freeman, 564 U.S. at 534 (plurality opinion) (“This straightforward analysis would 
avoid making arbitrary distinctions between similar defendants based on the terms of their plea 
agreements.”); id. at 544 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“In that respect I agree with the plurality 
that the approach of the concurrence to determining when a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentence may be 
reduced is arbitrary and unworkable.”). 
24. Re, supra note 2, at 1944; see also Freeman, 564 U.S. at 532-34 (plurality opinion); id. 
at 551-64 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
25. Re, supra note 2, at 1945-46.  
26. United States v. Epps, 707 F.3d 337 (D.C. Cir. 2013).   
27. 950 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1991).   
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that becomes “problematic” when, as in that instance, the Supreme Court 
splintered on the ultimate result.28 “If applied in situations where the 
various opinions supporting the judgment are mutually exclusive, Marks 
will turn a single opinion that lacks majority support into national law.”29 
Such analytical underlapping is the outcome of the opinions in 
Freeman. Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in that case was not a “logical 
subset” of the plurality opinion, as D.C. Circuit law required.30 There are 
cases where Justice Sotomayor would keep in prison those who the 
plurality would set free, and vice versa.31 Given that reality, Freeman 
offered no controlling authority, only persuasive authority. The Court 
deemed the plurality opinion the more compelling and sent Mr. Epps back 
to the district court for the possibility of sentence reduction.32 
III. The Hughes Resolution 
Five years later, after the Ninth Circuit adopted the D.C. Circuit’s 
reasoning in Epps, the Court took up the question of both the basic 
incoherence of the Marks rule and the merits question in Freeman and 
Epps.33 Much of the oral argument and the questions presented focused on 
the problems of Marks more generally, but the ultimate decision did not. 
It was easier, it seemed, to just answer the question directly. The Court 
concluded that “[i]n the typical sentencing case there will be no question 
that the defendant’s Guidelines range was a basis for his sentence,”34 
including when reached by plea agreement: “[a] sentence imposed 
pursuant to a [plea] agreement is no exception to the general rule . . . .”35 
The only exception is when “the Guidelines range was not ‘a relevant part 
of the analytic framework the judge used to determine the sentence or to 
approve the agreement.’”36 Even Justice Sotomayor, who “continue[d] to 
believe that [her] Freeman concurrence set[] forth the most convincing 
interpretation” of the statute, recognized that the consequences of that 
opinion “have done little to foster” the “foundational principles” of 
“integrity and legitimacy of our criminal justice system.”37 She, along with 
four other colleagues, joined Justice Kennedy’s opinion, which essentially 
restated the position reached in Freeman five years before. Trial courts, 
once and for all, had the discretion to modify sentences, even if defendants 
 
28. Id. at 782.  
29. Id. 
30. See id. at 781.  
31. For an example of this, see Judge Williams’s opinion in United States v. Duvall, 705 
F.3d 479, 487-88 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  
32. United States v. Epps, 707 F.3d 337, 353(D.C. Cir. 2013).  
33. Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018).  
34. Id. at 1775.   
35. Id. at 1776 (citations omitted).  
36. Id.  
37. Id. at 1779 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
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agreed to them in a plea agreement, in the event of modifications to the 
Sentencing Guidelines. 
IV. The Problem with Marks, the Tragedy of Freeman 
Thinking through the intersection of sentencing reform, plea 
agreements, and how to make sense of a divided Supreme Court does not 
shed new light into these old issues. But it does illustrate, importantly, how 
high the stakes are when the Supreme Court fails to muster a majority, and 
how little comfort Marks offers in that event. On the first point, someone 
could measure the sheer quantity of prison years that the Freeman 
misadventure imposed on the people of the United States, despite the fact 
that every relevant policymaking body had already concluded that the 
sentencing disparities required substantial revision. And for what? Even 
though the Court corrected this error, the cost is tremendous. 
More tenuously, this story invites, perhaps, more skepticism toward 
our cultic approach to judicial personalities. Marks protects an individual 
Justice from the responsibility of consensus and provides an incentive to 
put forward idiosyncratic views of the law that no other Justice accepts. 
Doing so can increase a Justice’s profile, particularly with any group that 
shares the idiosyncratic view. And the downside risk is minimal, since the 
lower courts under Marks are still bound by some ethereal notion that 
amongst the disarray there is a rule of law that commands precedential 
obedience. 
“It is time,” Re wrote of Marks,  
 
to step back and think about whether the Marks rule ever made sense in the 
first place. After doing so, the solution becomes apparent: courts should 
adhere to the normal majority rule for precedent formation in all cases. 
When the Justices do not express majority agreement, there is no logical or 
inevitable basis for inferring majority approval for any particular rule of 
decision.38 
 
The misadventures of Freeman and the boldness of the D.C. Circuit 
to cast aside a concurring opinion that seemed to fit so obviously within 
the parameters of Marks suggest Re’s superior path to judicial decision-
making. But whereas Re looks to the “cheapest precedent creator”39 as the 
fundamental justification for imposing the duty of clarity on the Court, I 
see the added potential benefit for much less personalization of the 
judiciary—for the betterment of society. If splintering a majority opinion 
no longer permits a single Justice to control the shape of the law in such 
idiosyncratic ways, the Court will speak much more clearly as an 
 
38. Re, supra note 2, at 1945-46.   
39. Id. at 1969 (citing GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 250 (1970)). 
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institution, rather than through its increasingly celebrity-status prone 
individual members. Of the many reforms to the overweening power of the 
Supreme Court,40 we can safely list the elimination of Marks low in its 
power and relevance. But it is, I would argue, part of the same problem. 
V. The Mischief of Middle Management 
This Essay is a substantive tribute to the craft of Judge Williams and 
his approach to his status as a “middle manager” who nonetheless placed 
importance emphasis on his independent judgment. Let me conclude on a 
slightly more personal note. Although I am not a scholar of criminal law, 
legal theory, the Supreme Court, or any of the issues discussed in this 
Essay, I find myself thinking about Freeman and Epps all the time. I was 
the law clerk tasked with working with Judge Williams on Epps and 
learned profound lessons about the role of the judge—whether or not in 
“middle management”—from watching Judge Williams at work, during my 
clerkship, and for the decade since. I have not (and would not) betray any 
confidences in discussing these cases. It is sufficient to note that Judge 
Williams’s profound commitment to individual and societal liberty was 
never on stronger display than when he encountered the fate of criminal 
defendants. His deft (mis)treatment of Marks taught me to approach the 
organs of our government with the same kind of citizens’ skeptical respect, 
a skepticism and respect vital to the functioning of our government. That 
he was bound by vertical stare decisis was very important to Judge 
Williams. He honored the rule of law and celebrated the important 
traditions in our system that enshrined it. He also had no trouble seeing 
where the fissures of those decision rules created profound injustice and 
what role he must play as a middle-management appellate judge in 
correcting them. His navigation of Epps was not motivated reasoning. It 
was the craft of judicial decision-making at its finest. I will conclude with 
his own words on this subject, from the concurring opinion in Duvall that 
launched his broadside against both Freeman and Marks: 
 
I do not believe United States courts should close the door on a man’s 
chance at release from prison on the basis of a framework (1) that eight out 
of nine justices of the Supreme Court have squarely rejected, and (2) that 
depends on the talismanic presence of special words in a plea agreement. 
Until Freeman, parties to [plea] agreements had no special reason to 
include these words, so their inclusion is completely random in relation to 
Congress’s purposes in enacting [sentencing reform].41 
 
 
40. See, e.g., Daniel Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 
YALE L. J. 148 (2019).  
41. United States v. Duvall, 705 F.3d 479, 485 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  
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“The peculiarity of keeping prison doors closed on such a basis,” he 
concluded, “justifies exercising our discretion to consider the question the 
parties appear to take for granted: whether Justice Sotomayor’s opinion is 
indeed binding upon us.”42 He didn’t have that vehicle in Duvall; he did in 
Epps. Given how explicitly the Ninth Circuit relied on Epps to justify its 
own similar decision, it is not unreasonable to think that Judge Williams’s 
deftness in the judicial craft and commitments to individual liberty led 
directly to the result in Hughes. In the great legacy he leaves behind to his 
family, his clerks, the D.C. Circuit, and the law, those commitments to craft 
and principle are central. 
 
 
42. Id. 
